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wo recent court decisions examined,
addressed, and adjudicated parallel issues potentially
determining the scope of rights of legions of
recording artists and freelance authors. While the
core of each case centered on the fact that the
agreements between each of the respective litigants
did not expressly grant (or reserve) the exercise of
the particular rights in dispute, the decisions of the
courts have seemingly antithetical results. A review
of each court's application of the governing law to
the disparate facts of each case presents an
interesting illustration of the relationship among
business, the arts, and the role of the CopyrightAct.'
In Greenfield v.Philles Records, Inc.,2 the New
York State Court of Appeals relied on "long-settled
common-law contract rules" 3 to determine the
breadth of rights transferred under the terms of a
1963 recording agreement. The court's seemingly
cold and sterile application of common law led it to
modify a lower court's ruling,4 rendering such lower
court's judgment in favor of the recording artists
little more than a Pyrrhic victory.
In New York Times Co., Inc. v. Tasini, the
Supreme Court of the United States considered the
merits of the assertion that section 201 of the
CopyrightAct 6 permits a publisher to reproduce and
distribute contributions to a collective work within
a searchable electronic database.7 Citing the

seemingly paternalistic intent of the legislative history
underlying the 1976 revisions to the Copyright Act,8
the Court ruled in favor of the freelance authors.
The protection of one's copyright interests
as secured by the United States Constitution9 cannot
exist in a vacuum. Only through legislative
amendments and ever-evolving case law can the
intent behind Article I, Section 8, Clause 8' ° be
preserved. This article is intended to illustrate the
evolving nature of the meaning of this clause through
a side-by-side review of the two cases set forth
above.

In 1963, the Ronettes, comprised ofVeronica
Bennett, 2 Estelle Bennett, and NadraTalley,signed a
five-year recording agreement with producer and
composer, Phil Spector. In exchange for a one-time
$15,000 cash advance 3 and the potential of
additional royalties when, and if, revenue generated
from the sales of master recordings exceeded such
initial cash advance,' 4 Spector's production company,
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Philles Records, Incorporated, acquired ownership
of the master recordings embodying the Ronettes
musical performances. Despite the commercial
success of Billboard-charting songs such as "Be My
Baby," "Walking in the Rain," and "Do I Love You,"'"
as well as recording and delivering dozens of
additional masters to Philles, 6the Ronertes never
received any royalties. In 1967, the Ronettes
disbanded, and shortly thereafter Philles Records
went out of business. However, even when Philles
Records went out of business, the rights in and to
the Ronertes'masters were retained by Philles' owner,
Phil Spector.
Subsequently,
with the resurgence of
public interest in '60's
music and the advent of Wi
new
recording
s
technologies,
most
notably,the compact disc

23
industry standards.

In New York Times Co. v. Tasini,25 numerous
freelance authors26 were separately engaged as
independent contractors by one or more of the
publishers of such periodicals as The NewYork Times,
New York Newsday, and Sports Illustrated to provide
articles for their periodicals.2 7 Each article was
registered with the United States Copyright Office
in the name of the respective author. Additionally,

or "CD," Spector began

to grant third parties the
right to synchronize the

N
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Ronettes' masters in
audio-visual works, such
as the use of "Be My
Baby" in the 1987 film
Dirty Dancing. 7 Not
stopping with the granting of these synchronization
rights, Spector also began to grant third parties the
right to produce and distribute the Ronettes' masters
for redistribution within the United States. 8 Despite
this new market for their music, and the resultant
newly found revenue streams, the Ronettes never
received any royalties from Philles or Spector.
In 1987, the Ronettes brought suit against
Spector in New York state court asserting that the
1963 recording agreement did not provide the
defendants with the right to license the subject
masters for synchronization or for domestic
redistribution. 9 The trial court awarded damages
and interest to the plaintiffs on the theories of breach
of contract and unjust enrichment.20 On appeal, the
Appellate Division affirmed the lower court's
decision concluding that the defendant's actions were
not authorized by the agreement because such
agreement did not specifically transfer the right to
issue synchronization licenses or third party
distribution licenses.2' TheAppellate Division further
held that the plaintiffs were entitled to receive 50
percent of income derived from synchronization and
third party licensing" consistent with current

each edition of the periodicals was registered, as a
collective work, in the name of the respective
publisher.
The New York Times, New York Newsday,and
Sports Illustrated each had separate agreements with
Lexis/Nexis, the owner and operator of NEXIS, a
computerized database that stores information such
as periodicals in text-only format.2 8 These
agreements authorized Lexis/Nexis to copy and sell
any portion of the articles previously appearing in
the publishers' periodicals. 9 NEXlS subscribers were
able to search for articles within the database using
a diverse range of criteria such as author, subject, or
key terms, as each article was "coded" to facilitate
computerized retrieval." Such search results would
appear as separate, isolated, stories without any
visible link to the newspaper or magazine in which
an article originally appeared.3' A subscriber could
then view,print, or download each article generated
by their search.32
In December 1993, the freelance authors
filed a copyright infringement action in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of
New York against the publishers of the various

periodicals, specifically alleging copyright
infringement." In response to the plaintiffs' suit, the
defense filed a motion for summary judgment
asserting the privilege accorded to collective work
copyright holders pursuant to section 201 (c) of the
Copyright Act. The District Court granted the
defendants' motion for summary judgment, 4 holding
that the use of the articles within NEXIS was subject
to a statutory privilege extended to the owners of a
copyright in a collective work.35 On appeal, the trial
court's decision was reversed, and the use of the
articles within NEXIS was found to be beyond the
scope of section 201 (c).36

In both Philles and Tasini, one of the central
problems was that the agreements between each of
the respective parties, the Ronettes and Philles in
Philles and the authors and the publications in Tasini,
did not expressly grant (or reserve) the exercise of
the particular rights upon which the plaintiffs' claims
and the subsequent litigation were based. Indeed,
the Philles court noted that, although the plaintiffs
conceded that the agreement unambiguously granted
the defendants unconditional ownership rights to
the masters, the plaintiffs then argued that the
agreement "does not bestow the right to exploit
such masters in new markets or mediums since the
agreement is silent on those topics."37 In Tasini, the
authors were engaged pursuant to agreements that
did not secure consent for the placement of an
article, by the publisher or any other third party,
within an electronic database. 8
Although each case pertained to the
exploitation of artistic works in new markets and

media and the failure of an existing written
agreement to address such exploitation, the issues
before the courts were framed in substantially
different manners. As the creation of the masters in
Philles pre-dated the extension of federal statutory
copyright protection to master recordings, which
did not occur until 1971. 9 the parties' dispute and
its resolution were not governed by the United
States Copyright Act. Rather, the issue before the
Philles court was whether the recording artists'
transfer of full ownership rights to masters also
conveyed the unconditional right to redistribute the
same in any technical format.' However, in Tasini,
both the authors' articles and the publishers'
4
periodicals were subject to copyright protection. 1
The issue, therefore, was whether use of an article
in a searchable electronic database was subject to
the privilege granted to the owner of a collective
work featuring such article pursuant to section
201(c).

42

This privilege allows a publisher to

reproduce and distribute an article as part of any of
three categories of collective works: (i)"the collective
work to which the author contributed such work;"
(ii) "any revision of that collective work;" or (iii) "any
43
later collective work in the same series."

The Philles court set the parameters of its
decision by noting that if an agreement is,on its face,
reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, a court
is not free to alter the agreement to reflect its
personal notions of fairness and equity.44 The court

then stated that the standard for introducing
extrinsic evidence to determine the intent of parties
to the agreement at issue turned on the issue of
ambiguity - extrinsic evidence could only be
introduced if the
agreement or any
pertinent part thereof
was found to be
ambiguous.The question
for the court thus
the
did
became:
agreement's silence on
synchronization and
domestic licensing create
an ambiguity which
permitted the court to
examine
extrinsic
evidence beyond the
four corners of the

Fl
agreement?4 Resoundingly,the court concluded that
there was no ambiguity, and that, therefore, there
was no need for examination of any extrinsic
evidence.
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the court did find that the schedule of royalties which
addressed domestic sales included the sale of
records, compact discs, and other audio reproductions
by entities holding third party distribution licenses
from Philles.55The
agreement thus
permitted Philles/
Spector
to
complete
y sexercise
ownership rights

h' r-elr

he

-,without

any

to
remit royalties to

Sobligation

Accordingly, the court did not allow the
admission of extrinsic evidence to modify or
supplement the express terms of the 1963
agreement.4 7 Again, as the masters' creation
preceded the extension of copyright protection to
such works, the court proceeded to scrutinize the
agreement using the applicable case law. NewYork
case law has a well-established precedent stating that
an artist/grantor does not retain any rights to artistic
property once it is unconditionally transferred.4"
Indeed, in analogous contract disputes, other courts
have recognized that broad contractual provisions
convey "virtually unfettered" 49 reproduction rights
to a grantee absent specific exemptions to the
contrary.5 0
The court then cited a provision within the
Ronettes' agreement as being dispositive since it
granted the "defendants the right to make
phonograph records, tape recordings or other
reproductions of the performances embodied in such
recordings by any method now or thereafter known,
and to sell and deal in the same."'" The court
concluded that the Ronettes' agreement, read as a
whole to determine its purpose and intent, is
2
susceptible to only one reasonable interpretation:
the defendants are authorized to license the masters
for visual media (such as movies and television
commercials or broadcasts) and for domestic release
by third parties in audio formats.3
The court therefore ultimately held that the
agreement, read as awhole, permitted the defendants
to exercise complete ownership rights without any
payment of royalties to the Ronettes for the revenue
derived from synchronization licensing. 4 However,

the plaintiffs for
synchronization
licenses. Philles/
was
Spector
found, however, to be subject to the payment of the
applicable royalties for domestic redistribution. Such
royalties were to be calculated pursuant to the terms
of the schedule of royalties included within the 1963
agreement (as opposed to the current industry
standard 50/50 as initially assessed by the lower
5 6

court)

In Tasini, the defendants had argued that
reproducing and distributing each article within a
database is subject to the publisher's "privilege of
reproducing and distributing the articles as part of
...a revision of that collective work, 5 7 The Tasini
Court began its analysis with a look at the privilege
set forth in section 201 (c) of the CopyrightAct.The
court applied this privilege to the facts before it by
delineating the two distinct sets of copyrights
concerned 8 - a copyright in each separate
contribution to a collective work 9 and a copyright
in the overall collective work. 0 Prior to the 1976
revisions to the CopyrightAct, authors risked losing
their rights when their articles appeared in collective
works without the requisite copyright notice.6' If a
publisher printed such article only in the publisher's
name, the author's work became part of the public
domain." With the 1976 revisions, Congress clarified
the confusing and frequently unfair legal situation
regarding rights in contributions. 6' The Court then

reinforced the legitimacy of Congress' intent, saying
that Congress' adjustment of the author/publisher
balance is permissible expression of the "economic
philosophy behind the [Copyright Clause]

'64

(i.e.,"the

conviction that encouragement of individual effort authorial rights which Congress established in
[motivated] by personal gain is the best way to section 201 (c), the Court affirmed the judgment of
6
advance public welfare"). 1
the Court of Appeals, 76 finding the defendants liable
The language of the statute itself says that a for infringement. 77
publisher is privileged to reproduce and distribute
an article only "as part of" any of three categories
1M.~
Cuet
S.ltrat
agemLa
of collective works: (i) the contribution as part of
"that particular collective work," (ii) "any revision of
that collective work" or (iii) "any later collective
The basis of the Copyright Act (and the
work in the same series."66 In an attempt to clarify copyright protection which theAct creates) is found
the statute, the Court explained that the statute is in Article I, Section 8, clause 8 of the United States
intended to adjust a publisher's copyrights in the Constitution. 78 This clause grants Congress the
collective work to accommodate a freelancer's power "to promote the Progress of Science ...by
copyright.67 Accordingly, if there is demand for a securing [to Authors] for limited Times ...the
freelance article standing alone, or in a new collection, exclusive Right to their Writings." 79 Even with this
the Copyright Act allows the freelancer to benefit constitutional protection of copyright, the interests
68
from that demand.
of business, as embodied by those entities wielding
In applying this section of the Act to the capitol and power, have historically trumped the
facts at hand, the Court began its inquiry by noting rights of artists, who are often lacking industry
that in determining whether the articles had been experience, business acumen, and/or the benefit of
reproduced and distributed "as part of ' 69 a legal counsel.80 It is for this reason that the
"revision '7 of the collective work in issue, the focus
fortification of copyright protection through both
is on the articles as presented to, and perceived by, a legislation and case law is so crucial to all artists
database user. In the case before it, the database seeking the protections promised in the Constitution.
presented articles to users absent the context The Court's application of section 201(c) in Tasini
provided by the original periodical editions. 7' Rather, preserved the integrity of authors' rights throughout
a user's search yields articles which appear as wholly- the literary world. Similarly, the advent of copyright
separate items. The original graphics and formatting protection in master recordings lessened inequities
are not present, and the article lacks the context of throughout the recording industry. In 197 I,Congress
being among the other articles with which the article amended the Copyright Act, extending copyright
was initially published. The Court emphasized this protection to masters. 8' Such legislation secured
fact, stating that a user was not viewing the articles copyright protection in masters "fixed" 2 in a
"as part of" any larger work but simply as "individual phonorecord83 for the first time after
February 15,
articles presented
individually." 72
The
Court
summarily rejected the

defendants' assertion
that reproducing and
distributing

article

within

each

P

a

database is subject to

the

"privilege

of

reproducing
and
distributing the articles
as part of... a revision
of that collective work, '73 as such an encompassing
construction would diminish the author's exclusive
rights. 7' To entertain the publisher's argument would
scarcely preserve the author's copyright in their work
as contemplated by Congress.7" Affirming the

Indeed, for those masters "fixed" after
February 15, 1972, the outcome of a dispute such as
that upon which Philles was based would theoretically
have been substantially different.8 A decision on par
with that of the Tasini Court would be anticipated.
1972.84

Much like the publishers' efforts thwarted by the
Tasini decision, record labels have worked to ebb
the tide of the expansion of artists' rights that has
resulted from the federal statutory recognition of
copyright protection in masters. Typically, a "belt
and suspenders" approach is taken to ensure that
any masters created by an artist pursuant to a
recording agreement are created as, and remain, the
property of such record label. Common industry
practice dictates that an artist is paid in one of two
ways, both essentially a prepayment of royalties.
Either an artist receives recording costs plus an
advance86 or an artist receives a recording fund. 8
Regardless of the form of this prepayment of
royalties, in exchange for such advance as well as
royalties upon recoupment, 88 a record label typically
acquires ownership in the masters performed and
recorded by the subject artist.89 Boilerplate
provisions in recording agreements of recent vintage
usually include a two-fold, fail-safe approach to
circumvent the Copyright Act and the reach of
section 102(a)(7) as follows:
Each master, video, and artwork
made under this agreement or
during its term, from the inception
of its recording, will be considered
a "work made for hire" for
Company;90
[I]f any such master, video, or
artwork is determined to be not
such a "work,' it will be deemed
transferred to Company by this
agreement, together with all rights
9
and title in and to it. 1
The effect of these provisions is to cause
copyright ownership in and to the masters to vest,
from inception, with the record label. Under the
work-for-hire doctrine, the record label (as opposed
to the artist) is deemed to be the author of the
masters. This doctrine is supplemented by the
requirement that, in the event the masters do not
vest with the label for whatever reason, the artist
will assign any and all interest in therein to the label.
Moreover, it has become industry practice
for the following grant of rights provision to be
included within recording agreements:
Company and any Person
authorized by Company has the
unlimited and exclusive rights to
manufacture and/or distribute
Records by any and all methods now

or hereafter known embodying any
portion or all of the performances
embodied on Masters hereunder;to
publicly perform such Records and
to permit the public performance
thereof in any medium; to import,
export, sell, transfer,transmit, lease,
rent, deal in or otherwise dispose
of such Masters and Records
derived throughout the Territory
under any trademarks, trade names
or labels designated by Company; to
remix, edit, or adapt the Masters to
conform to technological or
commercial requirements in various
formats now or hereafter known or
92
developed.
The result of the insertion of this provision into
recording contracts is that a label owns (or is entitled
to own) the masters and has the unfettered
discretion to exploit the same, solely as it deems
appropriate.
Innumerable parallels between these
boilerplate provisions and post- Tasini book publishing,
magazine, and newspaper agreements may be drawn.
Indeed, it has been stated that the sole purpose of
the so-called "all-rights" contracts93 now tendered
by publishers is to undermine the crucial principle
that each right in a contract must be claimed
separately and specifically and that any right not
claimed (i.e., expressly granted to the publisher)
remains with the author. 4
A recent trend has allowed artists to
negotiate the reversion (or assignment) of the subject
masters from the label to the artist directly into the
recording agreement. A typical provision would
provide that after an agreed upon number of years
(most often between 10 to 15 years) from the later
of the expiration of the recording agreement or
recoupment of any and all advances paid to the artist,
the label agrees to assign any and all copyrights in
and to the masters (recorded pursuant to the
recording agreement) to the artist. This artistfriendly 95 trend has allowed less-established labels
to compete with the majors and has also driven
down the initial advance that labels pay to the artist. 6
While not yet mainstream, this idea of a reversion
or assignment represents a substantial inroad toward
establishing a balance between business and artists
within the industry.

"o

See id.

'"I Can Hear Music" was the final Ronettes single released
by Philles in late 1966. THE RONETTES, I CAN HEAR MUSIC

(Philles Records 1966).

Philles did not become the great equalizer
between artists and labels. Generations of artists
(predating federal copyright protection in master
recordings) remain bound to the agreements to
which they originally subjected themselves, and unlike the authors' party to Tasini- they consequently
do not benefit from the paternalistic intent of the
Copyright Act. Such artists remain subject to the
strict terms of their particular agreements due to
the application of common law contract rules.
However, as part of the evolution of the relationship
between business and artists, Philles should not be
perceived merely as an albatross but rather should
serve as a beacon of warning to aid artists in
navigating the waters of the recording industry.
Similarly, while the Tasini decision preserved the
integrity of authors' rights throughout the literary
world, great care must be exercised to preserve such
in-roads. Although legislative amendments and case
law may serve to augment artists' rights, overreaching
agreements can trump such shifts in the balance of
power.
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Major publishing houses have listed all the rights the
publisher is acquiring from the author such as the right to
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13

9'Updike, supra note 80.
91See Phyllis Stark, Artists First at Equity Label, BILLBOARD
Aug. 1,2003, at I.

BULL.,

96 For

a parallel discussion regarding the subject of reversion
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